The central argument of this book is that despite all established formal constitutional requirements, there are multiple unwritten criteria that are used for appointing judges to the Supreme Court. The book examines the debates surrounding the Indian judicial system and anecdotal evidences and deeply analyses the Indian political developments that resulted in the present 'collegium system' of appointing judges to the Supreme Court of India and brings to the fore the secret and unwritten criteria that have determined the selection of judges to the highest court of law in this country. The National Judicial Appointments Commission's (NJAC) judgment on the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court has been the subject of a deeply polarized debate in the public sphere and academia. This book subsequently analyses the NJAC judgment and provides a rich context to it, in terms of philosophical, comparative, and constitutional issues that underpin it. The book examines the secret constitutional principles behind selecting judges and their application in the NJAC judgment; and comparatively looks at the judicial appointments process in the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Pakistan, enquiring into what makes a good judge and an effective appointments process. The book is a deep dive into the constitutional concepts of judicial independence and separation of powers as discussed in the NJAC judgment.